University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary

1990

Book Review: Gender Sanity: The Case Against
Feminism. Edited by Nicholas Davidson.
Dianne S. Farber

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Farber, Dianne S., "Book Review: Gender Sanity: The Case Against Feminism. Edited by Nicholas Davidson." (1990). Constitutional
Commentary. 263.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/263

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

1990]

BOOK REVIEW

141

Even to one who has read her book several times, Cott's analysis is sometimes batHing, Cott being most muddled when she needs
to be most precise. Never much of a stylist, she compounds her
difficulties by mentioning recent events without having prepared the
reader in any way for what she seems to regard as truisms. But
does everyone agree that feminism unites women's liberation and
women's rights, and do we all know what the differences are? For
that matter, does the women's liberation movement still exist? And
what does it mean to say that feminisms are growing toward the
plural?
When an accomplished scholar, whose footnotes demonstrate
wide reading and research, and who has many fresh things to say
about familiar subjects, writes as badly as this, one looks for the
reason. My impression is that Cott was never able to determine the
purpose of her study. She disagrees with other historians, including
me, on many points, often convincingly. What she has been unable
to do is to pull together her own material in such a way as to offer
an alternative reading. Cott does not attempt to disguise the failure
by cobbling together some rickety thesis after the fact, as often happens. Hers is an honest book, but even so the whole is less than the
sum of its parts.
The Grounding of Modern Feminism is still worth reading.
Cott's research is superb, and, unlike many who have written on
these subjects, her book is not didactic, quarrelsome, or ideological.
Further, she has a gift for finding new ways of looking at well
known problems. Next time I hope that she will add a fully developed thesis.

GENDER SANITY: THE CASE AGAINST FEMINISM.
Edited by Nicholas Davidson.1 Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America. 1989. Pp. 260. $19.95.
Dianne S. Farber2
Gender Sanity is an argument against radical feminism, a belief
system which says that all men exploit women; that the scientific
method is an instrument of subordination; that the beliefs and ideas
of Western civilization are oppressive to women; that women are
not just equal to but exactly the same as or better than men; that
I.
2.

Author, editor, and contributor to periodicals.
Contributor to periodicals.
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children and child care are vital only to the weak; and that the worthy goals of radical feminism justify repression of speech.
The book's title and many of its essays misleadingly equate
feminism with radical feminism. As a feminist, I believe that women should receive equal pay for equal work; that women have
wrongly been denied access to certain jobs in the past because of
their sex; that women should be accorded the same worth and dignity as men; that bearing and rearing children should be as respectable a job as any other; that women had some good reasons for
starting their revolution against the world that was. As a feminist, I
also find much merit in this book.
The most worrisome aspect of radical feminism is its intolerance of debate. Davidson raises this concern in the book's preface:
"Perhaps feminists are right to silence views with which they don't
agree; criticism of feminism is so dangerous and extreme that it justifies the repression of diversity." "Or perhaps-on the other
hand-feminism itself is an intolerant ideology that threatens
freedom."
Clearly, Davidson believes the latter, and the reader comes
away agreeing with him. Davidson describes a pervasive effort
within both the mass media and the academic community to deny
radical feminism's critics the opportunity to be heard. He asserts
the existence of a " 'Lace Curtain' of networked feminists" that by
"hatred and obscurantism" has affected every contributor to the
book. Three examples: (1) Steven Goldberg's book, The Inevitability of Patriarchy, on which one chapter of Gender Sanity is based,
actually held the 1988 Guinness Book of World Records top position
"for the most editors' rejections of any book ever published";
(2) "The Myth of the Role Revolution," by George Gilder, was initially accepted by Penthouse, the Atlantic, and Success magazine
and later rejected by each in tum "when editors discovered that the
piece would anger feminists"; (3) "The Truth About Domestic Violence," by R.L. McNeely and Gloria Robinson-Simpson, when initially published in the respected journal Social Work, "unleashed a
deluge of hate mail from feminists, including threats to stop the
authors' funding for future research."
In short, Davidson asserts that feminism is now "the gender
ideology of our society," and that public debate about the social
effects of twenty years of feminism has been stymied by the movement's success in preventing criticism of its ideology.
Because radical feminism has such a grip on today's intellectuals, books like Gender Sanity are seldom published, let alone widely
reviewed or heavily touted by their publishers. With the knowledge
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that few who read this review will ever see the book, I have taken
the liberty of quoting more extensively than is usual in a book review to help open up this stifled public debate.
I

Consistency and organization are problems in any collection of
essays, and Gender Sanity is no exception. The book's organization
seems arbitrary and its tone highly variable, ranging from Midge
Deeter's sardonic classic, "The Liberated Woman," written in fairy
tale style, and Jack Kammer's lighthanded effort in "The Noble
Savage," to the highly scholarly tone of Davidson's "The Rise and
Fall of Cultural Determinism," and Carol Iannone's "Feminist
Scholarship: A Case History."
One section, entitled "Children," illustrates some of the book's
shortcomings. First, the section contains only two articles, one being "Day Care and Children," by William and Wendy Dreskin, the
other Michael Levin's article on "The Impact of Feminism on Prima!"y Education." The Dreskins make some important points
about the repression of public discourse on the effects of day care.
Levin makes powerful criticisms of the totalitarian (or, if the subject
were not so serious, Alice in Wonderland) nature of attempts to
stamp out gender bias in public education. But Davidson should
have asked the authors to update their source materials. In an area
as volatile as radical feminism, fifteen-year-old data is ancient
history.
The Dreskin article is a reprint of "The Day Care Debate,"
from their 1983 book, The Day Care Decision: What's Best for You
and Your Child. The Dreskins make the point that the number of
American children in day care is grossly exaggerated in the mass
media, that "half of all children whose mothers work full time are
cared for by a family member or relative, and when a mother works
part time only one child in three is cared for by someone other than
a parent or relative." Nevertheless, "the number of children enrolled in day care centers has more than quadrupled" in the past
fifteen years, with these centers being used by "fifteen percent of all
children whose mothers work full time."
Some important work on the effects of day care is being done
by Jay Belsky, a researcher at Penn State University. If the
Dreskins had quoted data more recent than 1978 (and the 1987
copyright on some of the articles in Gender Sanity makes this seem
possible, even given publication lag), they could have offered details
about Belsky's work that graphically illustrate their observation
that:
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[W]hile many researchers do try to remain objective and unbiased when working in
an unpopular area, the absence of hard scientific proof in the day care debate has
led many experts to hide their suspicions or reservations about day care and adopt
an officially neutral or even pro-day care position, thereby avoiding the unpleasantness of intense criticism and political pressure. We believe that many of these same
professors who are taking a neutral position on the day care issue would openly
express their reservations and concerns in a climate where such an attitude was
welcome, or at least acceptable.

Recent events have revealed how far we are from providing a
tolerant climate for discussing the effects of day care. In 1986, Belsky publicized his findings after analyzing five studies of children
who were tested in the "strange situation," a test designed to measure the quality of an infant's attachment to the usual caregiver.3
Many researchers believe the quality of this attachment shows a
child's sense of trust and security and predicts future social adjustment. 4 Belsky found
evidence of less secure attachments when extensive nonmaternal day care had been
initiated in the first year of life. He has cited "a disquieting trend in the evidence on
older children," finding more aggressive and noncompliant behavior among 5-yearolds who as infants had extensive center-based care. In other studies of older
preschoolers he cites, children were described as more anxious and hyperactive than
their peers who had not been in care as infants. 5

Belsky's findings led to an avalanche of criticism of him both as
a researcher and as a family man. Press reports at the time described child care experts as "outraged not only that Belsky would
publish such a report but also that he would tout it on talk shows
even before it was published. "6 (Imagine that!) Some experts "accused Belsky of harboring a personal bias (his wife quit a professional position to raise their children) and of being publicityhungry. "7 One reporter, in a confession-style article, wrote of her
own child care arrangements and described how she had contacted
Belsky and asked him if he had ever considered "staying home so
that his wife might be the one to work for pay?"s When Belsky
replied that "the dual conceptualization [of him and his wife] was
always that I would be working," 9 the reporter wrote that:
... I wanted very badly ... to haul Jay Belsky out of his office at Penn State
University and prop him up in a rocking chair at 2 a.m. with a wrench in his viscera
because he loves so deeply the baby he is holding and he needs so wildly to reclaim
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1987, at 9, § B, col. I.
/d.
/d.
THE ATLANTIC, Aug. 1988, at 73.
/d.
L.A. Times, August 30, 1987, at 8, Part 6, col. I.

!d.
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his work-his other work, his paying work.! O

Belsky, with his feet to the fire, carefully and publicly defined
his enemies and lashed out against the " 'inflammatory' distortion
of his and others' research by conservative 'political partisans.' "II
"They [conservative partisans] have translated our message to mean that infant day
care is bad and that those who put infants in it are bad," said Dr. Belsky. "I have
never said that only mothers should care for their babies or that they should quit
their jobs to be home with them."12

Curiously, Belsky did not claim he was disturbed by the attacks on
himself, his wife, and his work made by the presumably liberal
press, by radical feminists and others on the left.
Finally, so loud was the clamor and so painful the handwringing, that Dr. Edward Zigler, director of the Bush Center in Child
Development and Social Policy at Yale University, set up an "extraordinary meeting"t3 in Washington, D.C. on October 23, 1987,
that he dubbed "an 'infant day care summit meeting.' "t4 The
meeting was held under the auspices of the National Center for
Clinical Infant Programs, a private non-profit child care organization, and was attended by Zigler, Belsky, and fourteen other prominent colleagues. At the meeting, Belsky's brief departure from
officially approved doctrine was quashed, neatly and some might
say elegantly, with the further bonus of reminding everyone that the
real danger was not intolerant radical feminist ideology but evil
conservatives.I5 And thus the "Lace Curtain" rang down on the
day care debate.
The Belsky flap illustrates well a point made again and again in
the Davidson book: because of the "Lace Curtain" "no aspect of
modern life has been so inadequately debated as feminism." Davidson's own contribution to the book, "The Rise and Fall of Cultural
Determinism," offers a history of the development of the "Lace
Curtain" beginning with the work of anthropologist Franz Boas
and, more importantly, Margaret Mead.
Davidson describes how cultural determinism, upon which
/d.
See N.Y. Times, supra note 3, at 9, col. I.
12. /d.
13. /d.
14. /d.
15. /d. The participants drafted a statement "supporting day care for infants and toddlers but declaring an urgent need for more available care and for better salaries, working
conditions and training for workers. . . . [T]he statement asserts that for both infants and
toddlers, 'there is every reason to believe that both children and families can thrive' when
parents 'have access to stable child-care arrangements featuring skilled, sensitive and motivated care-givers.' "
10.

II.
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radical feminism is based, I6 developed as the "latest incarnation of
the tabula rasa propounded by John Locke in the late seventeenth
century: that the human child is a blank slate upon which society
writes to create a personality." Calling this a "severely reductionist" idea, Davidson suggests that to believe in cultural determinism,
one must believe that "evolution, which determines most animal behavior, at some point ceased to affect human beings. The idea used
to explain this discontinuity is the modern anthropological concept
of 'culture.' " Davidson then criticizes Franz Boas, the father of
modern American anthropology, whose ideas "sound like surprisingly up-to-date-expressions of the American left."
Boas's most famous student was Margaret Mead, and Davidson notes that she "was the great popularizer of cultural determinism-particularly as it applied to the sexes." Mead wrote that
"[M]any, if not all, of the personality traits which we have called
masculine or feminine . . . are as lightly linked to sex as are the
clothing, the manners, and the form of headdress that a society at a
given period assigns to either sex.... " Mead backed up her declarations with field research that she said proved her theories.
Her research has since been found deeply flawed, inaccurate
not only in its conclusions but in its descriptions of the three societies she used to bolster her theories,I7 Davidson notes that "no professional critique of her Samoan work appeared in her lifetime; and
since there was no professional critique, there was no critique at
all." He offers an anecdote that explains the lack of criticism of
Mead's work as well as the curious persistence of certain ideas in
academia. The anecdote concerns one Lowell Holmes, a graduate
student in anthropology in the 1950s who returned from a field trip
to Samoa determined to make his name by revealing how wrong
Mead was. His academic advisor, a famous anthropologist, "listened in silence" as Holmes excitedly explained his findings.
"When Holmes finished, the professor looked him in the eye and
said deliberately, 'Don't attack Margaret.'" Holmes, defeated,
"produced a standard ethnography in which he took care not to
make waves." Davidson backs up the anecdote by citing a letter
from Holmes to Derek Freeman, an Australian who finally attacked
Margaret in 1983. Though she was dead and buried, Freeman was
reproached for his criticism, "less on scientific than on political
grounds." Davidson notes that Freeman's work was seen as "an
16.

See, e.g., B.

BENDERLY, THE MYTH OF Two MINDS: WHAT GENDER MEANS

(1987).
17. Steven Goldberg also takes on Mead in his oft-rejected contribution to the book,
"The Universality of Patriarchy."
AND DOESN'T MEAN
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assault on the social liberal world view." And it was, "for Mead's
work had indeed provided fifties and sixties liberals with their most
essential assumptions about man and society."
Davidson makes the important point that Mead's ideas, based
upon romantic notions more than careful field work, have held
sway for more than fifty years, "an eternity in the progress of modern science." He suggests rightly that American social science is in
desperate need of new ideas.
The sanctification of Margaret Mead began the weaving of the
Lace Curtain. As Davidson writes, "The university is the last surviving medieval institution in America, in which a guild mentality
among the tenured elect prevails, along with near-absolute authority over the candidates for initiation." He further notes, of the
Holmes episode, that "[C]ultural determinism was such a fundamental assumption of [the social liberal] consensus that to question
it was to guarantee exclusion or expulsion from the cushy club of
intellectual inquiry."
Holmes's lesson occurred in the 1950s, but Rosalind Rosenberg learned hers just three years ago. Rosenberg, a feminist historian at Barnard College, dared to do what Lowell Holmes lacked
the foolhardiness (or perhaps courage) to do: She publicly spoke
the truth as she understood it, and has since suffered professional
ostracism as well as other forms of harassment.ts
Carol Iannone, in her chapter on feminist scholarship, offers an
overview of the facts, which involved Rosenberg's testimony in the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's sex discrimination
suit against Sears, Roebuck, decided in 1986. The EEOC brought
suit against Sears, long known as a model affirmative action employer, for allegedly discriminating against women in its promotions of employees to commissioned sales jobs. Iannone notes that
the EEOC failed over a period of eleven years to find any witnesses
who could testify that they had been personally discriminated
against. However, there were few women in commission sales, and
the EEOC argued that "women act like men to maximize their incomes and would take good jobs if these were genuinely available."
Therefore, the paucity of women in commission sales jobs must reflect subtle and systematic discrimination.
Sears chose to fight back, for "the first time in the history of
this kind of suit." Attorneys for Sears contended that "factors
other than discrimination must be held accountable for the discrepancy." They sought an expert in women's history to back up their
18. See, e.g., Haskell & Levinson, Academic Freedom and Expert Witnessing: Histori·
ans and the Sears Case, 66 TEXAS L. REv. 1629 (1988).
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assertion, and-after several historians refused to testify-they
found Rosenberg. She argued that
women and men have had different interests, goals and aspirations regarding work.
For women, responsibilities in the home become a factor in choosing jobs, often
prompting women to choose less well-paying jobs that complement their family
lives over better-paying jobs that conflict. . . . Rosenberg asserted that women tend
to be less interested than men in the kinds of equipment sold in commission sales,
such as aluminum siding, furnaces and tires; and that they tend not to like the
competitiveness of commission work, the longer hours, and the irregularity and
uncertainty of income.

Rosenberg's analysis was shored up by at least one witness that
the EEOC had originally planned to call. This witness, Mary Nelle
Parks, 19 said in a deposition with a Sears lawyer that she had tried
commission sales "at the urging of Sears administrators" but "did
not like it."2o She further stated that
I cannot work well under pressure, and I was living on my own and had to be sure
that I could pay for my debts, the house note, the rent. On a 6 percent [commission] or any basis of that type you were not guaranteed anything particular, and I
needed to know what I could count on ... I knew I would wake up every morning
going to work knowing I have got to make this much today in order to meet my
bills, and I didn't want to work that way.21

Rosenberg's testimony was challenged by Alice Kessler-Harris,
also a women's historian, of Hofstra University. Kessler-Harris
"insisted that the record shows that women have always been available for good jobs as these open up to them . . . ." Going even
further, Kessler-Harris declared that "[F]ailure to find women in
so-called non-traditional jobs can thus only be interpreted as a consequence of employers' unexamined attitudes or preferences, which
phenonemon is the essence of discrimination. "22 In response, Rosenberg then provided thirty-two pages of documentation to show
that Kessler-Harris had committed "intellectual perjury," since her
testimony conflicted with her own published work.
Ultimately, the court found in favor of Sears on all claims, noting the "well-informed" nature of Rosenberg's testimony and the
"sweeping generalizations" of Kessler-Harris's. The decision was
affirmed (2-1) on appeal, and the EEOC declined to appeal
further.23
Rosenberg has been villified by her colleagues ever since.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

/d. at 1642 n.70.
/d.

!d.
/d. at 1635.
/d. at 1636 (noting that Rosenberg and Kessler-Harris actually played a very peripheral role in the trial, with statisticians playing the main part).
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When she and Kessler-Harris spoke at a Columbia University women's seminar, Rosenberg was jeered. She was called "traitor" and
her testimony termed an "immoral act" in a letter circulated
through the academic historian community. She has been called
immoral and unprofessional in articles in The Nation, Radical History Review, The Chronicle of Higher Education, and Ms. 24 She has
even been accused of "red-baiting."2s Most disturbingly, the complaint has not been with her views but with the fact that she testified
for the wrong side. As a result of Rosenberg's audacity in telling
the truth as she saw it, the Coordinating Committee of Women in
the Historical Profession and the Conference Group in Women's
History, at the 100th annual meeting of the American Historical
Association, held in 1986, passed a resolution declaring, "We believe as feminist scholars we have a responsibility not to allow our
scholarship to be used against the interests of women struggling for
equity in our society."
Even though Kessler-Harris ultimately admitted that "the
pressure of the adversary system caused her to exaggerate,"26 the
harassment of Rosenberg has not ended. In fact, the editors of
Signs, an important feminist studies journal, chose not to include
Rosenberg's rebuttal of Kessler-Harris, entitled "Written Rebuttal
Testimony of Dr. Rosalind Rosenberg" in their so-called " 'archive'
of materials pertaining to the Sears case.... "27
Carol Iannone, in summarizing her thoughts about the Rosenberg case, makes three points. First she notes that "feminist scholarship is for the most part politically motivated," although most
feminists do not believe this interferes with good scholarship.
But we see now that when the real world actually enters into the picture, there is no
space for male and female standards; it becomes either the standards as we know
them through intellectual and academic history, or the shabby expedients of political advocacy.

Second, and I believe most important, Iannone notes that "the interests of feminism are not necessarily identical with women's interests in general." Third, as I will explain later, she argues that
radical feminists hold conflicting and contradictory views on the nature of women.
The Sears case provides glaring examples of the discrepancy
between radical feminists' interests and those of other women, especially part-time workers. The EEOC decision to go after Sears was
24.
25.
26.
27.

ld.
/d.
/d.
/d.

at
at
at
at

1630-31.
1631.
1635.
1636.
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inextricably tied to a high level EEOC attorney's membership in
and devotion to the National Organization for Women.zs The attorney, David A. Copus, was on the NOW Compliance and Enforcement Task Force, and "was a major architect of NOW's
strategy at the same time that he was, as head of the EEOC's National Programs Division, put in charge of the Sears investigation. "29 (In fact, Copus's glaring conflict of interest was later
condemned at length by the Seventh Circuit as it reviewed the
case.)3o After the EEOC decided to sue Sears (because of its size,
not its egregious wrong-doing),31 part of Copus's strategy was to
charge that Sears' disproportionate hiring of women as part-time
workers was evidence of discrimination.32
Thus, a NOW -influenced lawsuit against the country's largest
employer of women, led that employer to spend twenty million dollars to defend itself. Although Sears was ultimately vindicated in
court, the case undoubtedly was watched anxiously by many companies that employ women. These companies may well have inferred from Sears' tribulations that having large numbers of parttime employees makes an employer vulnerable to a discrimination
complaint. Accordingly, some companies may now discourage
part-time work.33 As anyone in the real world should understand,
ordinary women with children have a great need for readily available part-time work. These women suffer when they have to work
full-time or not at all.
Iannone's final point is that radical feminism is caught up in
numerous contradictions. Radical feminists cannot decide whether
women are exactly the same as, or different from men. Thus they
try, as Iannone points out, to maintain "a certain strategic flexibility." Moreover, radical feminists cannot decide whether to portray
women "as victims or as active agents of their history." This confusion has led radical feminist scholars such as Kessler-Harris (quoted
here by Rosenberg) to criticize ordinary women's responses to the
work world, in statements like the following:
28. /d. at 1638 n.53.
29. /d.
30. /d.
31. /d.
32. /d. at 1640 n.61.
33. /d. The Sears strategy was in fact so controversial within the EEOC that its Office
of General Counsel leaked memos to the press. One such memo recommended dropping the
part-time work discrimination charge, due to "the undeniable fact that a far greater proportion of the female work force than the male work force is interested in part-time work." By
the time of the trial, this charge had been dropped from the case; arguably, the point is still
valid, that other employers closely watching the case might use the Sears example to avoid
hiring part-time workers lest they be sued also.
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[e]ven after women were "sucked into the competitive maelstrom, ... they continued to rationalize their activities in terms of familiar humane and nurturing values."
These values, which were suited to family succor, tended to foster "inappropriate
behavior patterns for participation in a competitive world."34

Or the following, also from Kessler-Harris: "Still caught in the belief that the home came first, about one-third of the married women
who earned wages [circa 1970) took part-time jobs .... "35
It is not surprising that radical feminist strategists give parttime work short shrift: As Kessler-Harris writes, to them it is a sign
of the weakness of ordinary women who are still caught up in incorrect behavior, that is, behavior different from the radical feminists',
and not politically correct according to their repressive world
view.36
II

I would add another criticism of radical feminism to those of
Carol Iannone, a criticism touched upon in both Rita Kramer's
piece, "The Establishment of Feminism," and in Midge Deeter's
rapier-penned offering, "The Liberated Woman." The charge is
that radical feminism is blind to its class contradictions.
As Kramer notes, Betty Friedan, in The Feminine Mystique,
claimed to hear women's voices saying they wanted more than
home, husband, and children. But, as Kramer observes,
she was doing her listening primarily among college-educated upper middle class
suburban housewives like herself, and her view of the American woman's lot was at
best a limited one, hardly applying to the millions of working class white women
and millions more black women who would have far preferred staying home to
factory, clerical, or domestic work, and for whom jobs were not the route to selffulfillment, the answer to an identity crisis, but an often bleak and boring economic
necessity.

Betty Friedan was not talking about the women who worked at
Sears. Aileen Fernandez, a black lawyer who succeeded Friedan as
president of NOW in 1975, observed that "some black sisters are
!d. at 1650.
!d. at 1654.
Cheri Loveless, in her contribution entitled The Invisible Majority: America's
Homemakers, points out that fully ninety-one percent of women in a 1986 Newsweek poll
done by the Gallup Organization ''indicated a preference to be at home at least part of the
working day." Loveless notes, however, that in reporting the finding, Newsweek said only
that "71 percent of the at-home mothers surveyed said they would like to work, and 75
percent of working mothers said they would work even if they didn't need the money." The
former figure was arrived at by lumping together women who said they would like to work
full-time, part-time or at home. Only nine percent wanted to work full-time regular hours.
The latter figure of seventy-five percent was undercut by an accompanying chart showing that
only thirteen percent of those interviewed who worked full-time wanted to work full-time
regular hours.
34.
35.
36.
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not sure that the feminist movement will meet their current needs"
which another black woman defined for Betty Friedan as "for black
men to get ahead." We see, looking back, how prophetic those
questioning black voices were, and how scarcely those needs have
been met by radical feminism.
Indeed, the worth of all women's lives in past generations
seems to have been washed away in the angry rhetoric of radical
feminism. Now and then one reads a brief homage to Rosie the
Riveter, but both academia and the popular media seem to accept
Friedan's descriptions of women's lives, pre-1963, as totally valid.
In twenty-five years, no one has gotten much of an audience contradicting her description of empty suburban lives, women "living with
their feet bound in the old image of glorified femininity, confining
them to family life and to the home, 'a comfortable concentration
camp.'"
This image of women insults and demeans the great majority of
women who were not living comfortable suburban lives, pretending
to be helpless as good manners dictated in that stifling milieu. Indeed, George Gilder in his chapter "The Myth of the Role Revolution," by placing women's lives in the historical context of the
industrial revolution, reminds us that most women have always
worked hard-at agriculture. He goes so far as to say that the sexual revolution is more a story of both women and men leaving the
farm than a tale of gender transformation. "As recently as eighty
years ago," he writes, "most American families were engaged in agriculture; this proportion has dropped to 3 percent. That is truly a
revolution .... " Furthermore, Gilder notes, on farms "women did
not restrict themselves to the kitchen and boudoir. Women in agriculture worked very hard beyond the hearth and cribside, commonly performing an array of jobs requiring far more onerous
physical labor and longer hours than their current work."
Gilder's observations fit the world I knew in the 1950s far better than Friedan's. Surely my experience was not that unusual. I
knew farm women who were proud of their physical strength. They
needed it. I knew teachers whose children carried latchkeys. I
heard stories of poor women in Europe three generations before me
who worked in coal mines. Most of these women viewed themselves as partners with their men in a harsh world.
It is the element of partnership that is missing in Friedan's oftrepeated stories of women trapped in the kitchen. It is the gratefully acknowledged contribution of women to the family's work
that has been forgotten in the bitter tales of woman's "chains that
bind her in her trap." It is the truth that is missing when all women
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are allowed to look at the world only through the childish eyes of
Midge Deeter's "Liberated Woman."
Deeter's chapter is taken from her 1971 book, but it still rings
true. She describes the rising consciousness of a young woman who
"was born into a very real world, and not a princess, [although] it
may be only a little fanciful to imagine that her birth was attended
by a visitation of good fairies." This young woman was born at the
close of World War II, spent her growing up years in "a community
of the economically secure." She was denied only those things that
it was deemed in her best welfare to deny. The young woman was
given the best of educations, ample sexual freedom, financial support by her parents when she decided after college to become a
writer, in short, everything she could ever desire. Then she discovered "Women's Liberation."
The heroine has her consciousness raised, learns that she is expected to be one of society's "breeders," and gives in to her feelings
of "sweet bitterness." This young woman wants to hear about her
own personal oppression, she wants to keep "those good ugly feelings." Gradually, in her formerly comfortable relationship with her
lover, a rift grows, as "between them now, from breakfast to bed,
would be the consciousness of a necessary, inevitable enmity and of
the need to protect themselves most of all in the very place meant to
be a haven from enemies-at home."
Deeter ends her tale by talking about the young woman's idea
of freedom:
... the freedom she truly seeks is ... a freedom demanded by children and enjoyed
by no one: the freedom from all difficulty. If in the end her society is at fault for
anything, it is for allowing her to grow up with the impression that this is something
possible to ask. Even the good fairies who attended her birth would never have
dared so far.

If our heroine is to have all she wants, with no cares, she must
have the services of others-nannies, housekeepers, errand-runners-lesser beings among the elect, who make her world run
smoothly. Radical feminism put in this context is in reality freedom
only for the select few-the ones the magazines write for and the
manufacturers make consumer goods for. While they are having it
all, they also demand that society collectively free them from any
troubling guilt for their actions or inactions, especially as regards
their behavior toward their children.37
37. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, March 22, 1989, at 6, § B, col. I. The article discusses
problems beginning to appear among some pre-school and elementary school age children of
those two-career couples who employ nannies, au pairs, and housekeepers. Priscilla Vail, a
private school administrator, said " 'we had begun to see bright children from highly edu-
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III
Taken together, the essays in this collection make a convincing
case that radical feminism is an intolerant ideology. In the preface
the editor asks, "Is there a viable alternative?" He does not offer
one. While several articles hint at alternatives, none really offers a
cohesive prescription for a less destructive ideology, one that
promises fair treatment to all without scapegoating one sex or the
other.3s
How is the reader of Gender Sanity to begin rethinking the
dominant sexual ideology of our time? One begins with the premise
that radical feminism "has begun to lose the ideological wars," and
that "it has begun to lose the moral ground as well," as Carol Iannone observes. One admits there are no winners in this war between women and men, and children are chief among the losers. In
a world where the women hate the men, a woman with a boy child
is compromised. How can she raise a son if she despises what he
will become? How can she reconcile the moral effect of such hatred
upon her daughters?
Significantly, Davidson included few articles about children,
presumably because radical feminists don't talk about them. Children are an embarrassment to the Cause. Children go with the
kinds ofwomen who work part-time at Sears. If there were no children, women could just go on arguing with men about who is better, stronger, purer, smarter.
Radical feminists don't know what to do about children, the
power of children to entrap women in webs of love and need. They
have tried to stamp out other women's need for children and they
have labored mightily over their own denial. Children are a burden
and make women weak. This is now a cultural adage.
Yet if we were quite sane, if we even approached the dilemma
as good economists,39 we would try to balance a woman's economic
cated parents coming to class lacking in some very basic skills.' " Ms. Vail noted "a decline
in vocabulary skills," and observed that "private-school pupils no longer understood their
world the way 'kids brought up in these types of homes traditionally did from very early
on.'" Ms. Vail "was referring to the fact that some parents today, while still strongly concerned about their children's education, seemed less willing to put in the time to provide their
children with certain basic skills."
38. Davidson does include two articles by Cheri Loveless, a founder of the support
organization Mothers at Home. One, Heirs to a Movement: Today's Guilty Mothers, spells
out the conflicts a woman today faces when she tries to reconcile home and work. Loveless
offers the sensible suggestion that women should be free to decide their lives for themselves,
but she offers no way out of the impasse.
39. See e.g., V. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 68 (1988). Economist Fuchs argues convincingly that women value children more than men do. He notes that
if men valued children more than women did, men would pay women dearly to have them.
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loss as a consequence of having children against the worth of children to the woman and society. We would see to it that women get
what most women want-time enough to nurture their children adequately without being punished later by an unforgiving job market.
Children make losers of women only because our society devalues
childraising.
Surely we can have no peace until we admit that children need
us all, with our varied talents and skills, some probably gender
based, some socially shaped, but all important. We can never
reacknowledge this simple truth until we break free from radical
feminism's repressive ideology that would deny us a free exchange
of ideas. We must make up our own minds, live our lives in support
of one another instead of at war, care for our children as we see fit,
free from an ideological burden that impoverishes us all. We must
learn to reconnect if our society is to survive.

FORTAS: THE RISE AND RUIN OF A SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE. By Bruce Allen Murphy.1 New York:
William Morrow. 1988. Pp. 717. $25.00.
John C Cha/berg2

This is an overly long book about the public life of a Supreme
Court Justice and his unplanned, undesired, and very brief judicial
career. Justice Fortas served on the Court for a mere four years.
Hounded by Lyndon Johnson to fill the vacancy created by the
strange resignation of Arthur Goldberg, this "lawyer's lawyer's
lawyer" reluctantly agreed to leave his lucrative Washington practice rather than disappoint his friend and client, the president. Harried by congressional conservatives, Fortas reluctantly resigned
from the Court in 1969 rather than face certain impeachment at the
hands of his enemies in Congress. In between there was the aborted
nomination of Fortas to Chief Justice in the waning months of the
Johnson presidency.
All this and more has been chronicled by Professor Bruce Allen Murphy, whose previous book was a study of the non-judicial,
perhaps even injudicious, activities of Louis Brandeis and Felix
Frankfurter.
Like the work on Brandeis and Frankfurter, this is biography
I.
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